James M. Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Company, a Utah corporation, Borden, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Casa Herrera, Inc., a California corporation, and John Does I thru X, inclusive : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
James M. Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Company, a
Utah corporation, Borden, Inc., a New Jersey
corporation, Casa Herrera, Inc., a California
corporation, and John Does I thru X, inclusive :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Allan T. Brinkerhoff; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Jay E. Jensen; M. Douglas Bayly; Christensen, Jensen
& Powell; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Douglas M. Durbano; Paul H. Johnson; Durbano & Associates; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Company, No. 920106 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3022
WI « n ^VJUH1 VI* APPEALS 
BRIEF 
fTAH 
OCUMEf^T 
F U 
ttQ IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PCKET NO. %2QW(rCAr 
JAMES M. ARAGON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, BORDEN, INC., 
a New Jersey corporation, 
CASA HERRERA, INC., a California 
corporation, and JOHN DOES 
I thru X, inclusive 
Defendants/Appellees. 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED IN 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Presiding 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE CASA HERRERA, INC. 
Jay E. Jensen, #1676 
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Casa Herrera, Inc. 
Douglas M. Durbano 
Paul K Johnson 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
3340 Harrison Blvd., #200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801) 621-4111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
James M. Aragon 
Allan T. Brinkerhoff 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #400 
Salt Lake city, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees Clover 
Club Foods Company and Borden, Inc. 
Case No. 920106-CA 
Priority No. 16 
FILED 
APR 2 8 1992 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES M. ARAGON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, BORDEN, INC., 
a New Jersey corporation, 
CASA HERRERA, INC., a California 
corporation, and JOHN DOES 
I thru X, inclusive 
Defendants/Appellees. 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED IN 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Presiding 
B R I E F Q F A p p E L I J E E C A S A HERRERA, INC. 
i; iL. jensen, #1676 
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Casa Herrera, Inc. 
Douglas M. Durbano 
Paul H. Johnson 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
3340 Harrison Blvd., #200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801) 621-4111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
James M. Aragon 
Allan T. Brinkerhoff 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees Clover 
Club Foods Company and Borden, Inc. 
Case No. 920106-CA 
Priority No. 16 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 2 
A. Nature of Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings 3 
C. Statement of Facts 4 
1. Facts Regarding Accident 4 
2. Identification of the Mixer's Manufacturer 
and Filing Against Casa Herrera 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 7 
I. ARAGON'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LIMITATION IS 
CONTRARY TO THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT 7 
A. This Court's Duty Is to Determine the 
Legislature's Intent When Interpreting the 
Phrase "Both the Harm and Its Cause." 7 
B. The Utah Supreme Court Has Established the 
Criteria Which this Court Should Employ to 
Interpret the Limitation 8 
1. Each term used advisedly 9 
2. Significance of Omissions 9 
3. Usually accepted meanings 9 
4. Lack of ambiguity 10 
C. Even If One Assumes That the Statute is 
Ambiguous, the Utah Product Liability Act 
Reflects the Legislature's Intent to 
Restrict, Rather than to Expand, a 
Manufacturer's Liability in a Product 
Liability Action 10 
i 
D, The Utah Leg i s l a tu re ' s In tent I s Clearly 
D i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h a t of t h e 
Washington Legislature as In terpre ted by 
the Washington Courts 11 
E. The More Restrictive Interpretation 
Achieves an Appropriate Balance Between 
Competing Objectives 12 
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THIS COURT TO MANDATE A 
COMMON LAW REQUIREMENT THAT A LIMITATION BE 
TOLLED UNTIL A PLAINTIFF KNOWS THE IDENTITY OF 
A PRODUCT'S MANUFACTURER 16 
A. Concealment Does Not Provide a Basis for 
Requiring Knowledge of the Manufacturer's 
Identity 17 
B. Nothing in the Circumstances of This Case 
Constitutes Exceptional Circumstances 
Which Would Make Application of the 
General Rule Irrational or Unjust 18 
III. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY PROVIDED 
DIRECTION REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF UTAH 
CODE § 78-15-3 TO PERSONS IN ARAGON'S SITUATION. . . . 19 
A. Evolution of Utah Product Liability Act 
Time Limitation 19 
B. The Legislature, Aware That Some Applica-
tions of the Statute Might Otherwise Be 
Unconstitutional, Declared Its Intent That 
the Limitation Did Not Apply to Persons in 
Mr. Aragon's Position 20 
IV. EVEN IF THIS COURT ACCEPTS ARAGON'S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY 
ACT LIMITATION, HIS CLAIM IS NONETHELESS BARRED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 21 
CONCLUSION 23 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A February 19, 1992 Order 
Appendix B Utah Code 78-12-25(3) 
Appendix C Utah Code 78-15-1 et seq. 
Appendix D Memorandum Decision 
Appendix E October 22, 1991 Ruling 
Appendix F November 13, 1991 Order 
Appendix G Notice of Appeal dated November 13, 1991 
Appendix H October 5, 1989 Letter 
Appendix I Affidavit of Paul Johnson 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Allisen v. American Legion of Post No. 134. 
763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988) 8 
Becton Dickinson and Company v. Reese. 668 P.2d 
1254 (Utah 1983) 16-18 
Berry v. Beach Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670, 681 
(Utah 1985) 10, 11, 19 
Board of Education of Granite School District v. 
Salt Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) 8 
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 97 fn. 7 
(Utah 1991) 20 
Guebard v. Jabaay. 381 N.E.2d 1164 (111. App. 1978) 13, 14 
Hector. Inc. v. United Savings and Loan Association. 
741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987) 8 
Johnson v. State Tax Commission. 411 P.2d 831, 832, 
17 Utah 2d 337 (1966) 8 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson. 514 P.2d 217, 219, 
30 Utah 2d 102 (1973) 8 
Krasnow v. Allen. 562 N.E.2d 1375 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1990) 14, 15 
Mvers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) 12, 13 
Orear v. International Paint Co., 796 P.2d 759 
(Wash. App. 1990) 6, 11, 12 
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty. 608 P.2d 242, 
243 (Utah 1980) 10 
Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of America. 784 P.2d 1158 
(Utah 1989) 19 
Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) 22 
Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 
(Utah 1991) 2 
iii 
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) 2, 21 
Toronto v. Sheffield. 222 P.2d 594, 596, 
118 Utah 460 (1950) 20 
Statutes 
Utah Code § 78-2-2(4) 1 
Utah Code § 78-2-2 (j) 1 
Utah Code § 78-2a-3 (2) (j ) 1 
Utah Code § 78-12-25 19, 23 
Utah Code § 78-12-25(3) 1-3, 7, 21 
Utah Code § 78-12-28(3) (1953) 21 
Utah Code § 78-15-1 et seg 2 
Utah Code § 78-15-3 1, 7, 19 
iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
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Mr. Aragon's injury which occurred approximately three years and 
four months prior to the effective date of the legislation? 
C. If the Utah Product Liability Act limitation 
requires knowledge of the identity of the manufacturer as well as 
the fact of injury caused by a product, did Mr. Aragon file his 
claim within two years of the time he should have known of Casa 
Herrera's identity? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The trial court granted judgment as a matter of law. An 
appellate court accords no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions, reviewing them for correctness. Rollins v. Petersen, 
813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991). However, even if the trial 
court's legal conclusions are erroneous, this Court may affirm the 
trial court on any proper legal basis. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutes determinative of the issues are Utah Code 
§ 78-12-25(3) and Utah Code § 78-15-1 et seq. which are reproduced 
in their entirety in Appendices B and C respectively. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case. 
This is a product liability action brought by Mr. Aragon 
seeking damages for injuries to his arm allegedly caused by a 
mixing machine manufactured by Casa Herrera, Inc. 
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B. Course of Proceedings. 
Aragon originally brought an tction against Clover C" ;b 
Foods ".•• ' • ' * -  -tes District C c " ^ 
for th<- Districi ^vemfce, . Di le tn lari . ;„ 
diversity iurisdiction, the federal court dismissed the action on 
^. 
Aragon refiled the action ^" ^ e Secor , - J * J : ^ -.. 
Court of Davis C.untv 'jr. Ma\ August -*\ Arac-n 
move " y'v ~r as a 
defendant• The trial court granted lea ve to amend on October 
1990, and Aragon served the amended complaint upon Casa Herrera on 
* -> T o m casa Herrera moved for summary judgment, 
asserting that r nee mon- t:ian t.ui ye.trs had elapsed between the 
occu; . •... i .e t i n n y ui uie 
complaint i ^ m . Cdba n e n - L a . , Aragon's claims 
against Casa H e n e r a were barred
 u he f;erms : Utah Code § 78-12-
) . 
^- ^ul" 23, 1991, the trial court heard argument on Casa 
Herrera' s -.otior as well as a motion for summary judgment filed by 
* : •*•. I 2 : >: tip »< ai i] - c : '* - Inc. The tr • 11 
court issuea * einoranuu.! decision grai <---9 wu^a Herrera's mo; i 
on July 31, 1992 (Appendi x P) 
: - 11 j 1 "' ' - - pursuant 'il^ - -
r^-1- ^ules - . Procedure. ^: • • .earing on . .,__ 
1991, che t r u . court issued .ilmg dated October I-9L 
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affirming its previous grant of summary judgment. (Appendix E) 
The trial court executed its formal order on November 13, 1991. 
(Appendix F) 
Aragon filed his notice of appeal on December 13, 1991. 
(Appendix G) The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this 
Court by order dated February 19, 1992. (Appendix A) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Insofar as they are material to Mr. Aragon's claims 
against Casa Herrera, the facts as asserted by Aragon are as 
follows: 
1. Facts Regarding Accident. 
Mr. Aragon commenced working for Clover Club Foods on 
December 3, 1985. (Letter of Aragon7s counsel dated October 5, 
1989—Appendix H) On December 12, 1985, he was operating a dough 
mixing machine (sometimes referred to as a masa feeder). (Ibid.) 
At approximately 4:15 p.m., he shut the mixer off, but his super-
visor subsequently directed him to clean the machine. (Ibid.) 
Aragon re-started the feeder, let it run for several minutes, and 
then started to climb three steps next to the mixer with the 
intention of looking into the top of the machine. (Ibid.) As he 
mounted the steps, Aragon slipped on some grease and, while attem-
pting to steady himself, grabbed the edge of the feeder. (Ibid.) 
A paddle swept his arm into the machine, injuring his left arm and 
hand. (Ibid.) 
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2. Identification of the Mixer's 
Manufacturer and Filing Against 
Casa Herrera. 
Aragon's first attempt to identify the manufacturer of 
the machine was his counsel's letter to Clover Club Foods and/or 
Borden, Inc. in October, 1989. (Appendix H) 
When Clover Club did not respond, Aragon filed an action 
against Clover Club and Borden in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah on November 10, 1989. (Affidavit of Paul 
Johnson, Appendix I) Aragon filed his first discovery requests 
seeking the identity of the machine's manufacturer on January 11, 
1990—approximately four years and one month after the accident. 
(Ibid.) The district court dismissed the federal action for lack 
of diversity on April 20, 1990, and Aragon refiled the complaint in 
the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County on May 11, 1990. 
(Ibid.) On July 13, 1990, Clover Club and Borden identified Casa 
Herrera as the machine's manufacturer. (Ibid.) Aragon filed his 
action against Casa Herrera in or about October, 1990. (Ibid.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Aragon argues that the two year limitation of the Utah 
Product Liability Act, effective April 24, 1989, governs his claims 
against Casa Herrera and that the limitation period commenced on 
July 13, 1990, the date Clover Club and Borden answered his 
discovery requests. Aragon must convince the Court that the Utah 
Product Liability Act limitation does not commence when a plaintiff 
becomes aware of an injury caused by a product—terms expressly 
stated in the statute—but only when the plaintiff additionally 
5 
acquires knowledge of the manufacturer's identity, a term Aragon 
petitions the Court to imply in the statute. Aragon's contentions 
are ill-founded on two bases. 
This Court's function in interpreting statutes is to 
determine the legislature's intent. The Court should note in 
ascertaining this intent that (1) the language employed in a 
statute is used advisedly, (2) omissions are significant, and 
(3) words are to be given their natural and accepted meaning. In 
light of these criteria, the express language of the statute can 
only be interpreted to mean that the commencement of the limitation 
period is conditioned on two factors—knowledge of injury caused by 
a product. 
The history of the Utah Product Liability Act demon-
strates that the Utah Legislature intended to restrict rather than 
broaden a plaintiff's rights in a product liability action. This 
intent contrasts markedly with the intent of the Washington 
Legislature as determined by the Washington courts. Accordingly, 
the Orear decision cited by Aragon is distinguishable. 
The Court should not imply a discovery term in light of 
the circumstances here since by due diligence Aragon could have 
learned Casa Herrera's identity in a timely fashion. 
Because commencement of the Utah Product Liability Act 
limitation period is not conditioned on knowledge of the manufac-
turer's identity, the Court cannot constitutionally retroactively 
apply the two year limitation from the date of Aragon's accident. 
The Utah Legislature expressly provided that in the event that an 
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application of the limitation was invalid, the provision would not 
govern. Accordingly, Utah Code § 78-12-25(3), the four year 
limitation period, applies and bars Aragon's claims. 
In the event that the Court determines that commencement 
of the Utah Product Liability Act limitation is conditioned on 
knowledge of the manufacturer's identity, the Court should still 
uphold the trial court. The limitation period commences when a 
claimant knows or should have known the requisite information. 
Even if this Court allowed Aragon a period equal to the length of 
the limitation to obtain the information, Aragon7s action against 
Casa Herrera was still untimely. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ARAGON'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LIMITATION IS 
CONTRARY TO THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT. 
A. This Court's Duty Is to Determine the Legislature's Intent 
When Interpreting the Phrase "Both the Harm and Its Cause." 
Utah Code § 78-15-3 states: 
A civil action under this chapter shall be 
brought within two years from the time the 
individual who would be the claimant in such 
action discovered, or in the exercise of due 
diligence should have discovered, both the harm 
and its cause. [Emphasis added.] 
According to Aragon, the two year limitation commenced once he knew 
of the harm, the cause of the harm, and the identity of the 
machine's manufacturer. In reaching this conclusion, Aragon relies 
on decisions of the Arizona and Washington appellate courts. 
Aragon ignores the fact that the limitation at issue is a Utah 
statute and that the Arizona and Washington courts were not 
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interpreting this statute when they reached their conclusions. The 
Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that: 
The fundamental consideration which transcends 
all others in regard to the interpretation and 
application of a statute is: What was the 
intent of the legislature? 
Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 411 P.2d 831, 832, 17 Utah 2d 337 
(1966) . Thus, this Court's duty is not to rely on decisions 
interpreting other states' statutes but to determine what the Utah 
Legislature meant when it enacted the two year limitation contain-
ing the phrase "both the harm and its cause.11 
B. The Utah Supreme Court Has Established the Criteria Which this 
Court Should Employ to Interpret the Limitation. 
In interpreting the statute, the Court (1) must presume 
that each term was used advisedly (Board of Education of Granite 
School District v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 
1983)); (2) should note omissions and give them effect (Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217, 219, 30 Utah 2d 102 
(1973)); and (3) interpret each term in accord with its usually 
accepted meaning (Hector, Inc. v. United Savings and Loan Associa-
tion. 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987)). Where the statutory language 
is plain and unambiguous, the Court is to construe the statute 
according to its plain language. (Allisen v. American Legion of 
Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). Applying these aids 
to the interpretation of the two year limitation leads to the 
conclusion that knowledge of the manufacturer's identity is not 
required before the two year limitation period starts to run. 
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1. Each term used advisedly. 
The limitations period starts to run when the injured 
party discovers "both the harm and its cause." Significantly, the 
legislature used the word "both" to preface the elements necessary 
to commence the limitation period. As defined by Webster's Seventh 
New Collegiate Dictionary, the term "both" means "the two: the one 
and the other." By using the word "both," the legislature was 
obviously referring to only two elements. By contrast, Aragon 
invites this Court to add a third element—the identity of the 
manufacturer. The word "both" is nonsensical when used in a 
context referring to three elements. 
2. Significance of Omissions. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court not only presumes that 
each term in a statute is used advisedly, but it also assumes that 
omissions are significant. Had the legislature intended to include 
knowledge of the manufacturer's identity as an element required to 
commence the limitation period, it would have expressly stated this 
intention. 
3. Usually accepted meanings. 
Neither Aragon nor Casa Herrera questions the meaning of 
the term "harm." The dispute is over the meaning of the phrase 
"its cause." As commonly used in a strict products liability 
action, the term "cause" refers to the connecting link between the 
injury and the alleged defective condition of the product. 
9 
4• Lack of ambiguity. 
The language of the statute is unambiguous, and the Court 
need go no further than to apply this statute according to its 
terms, i.e. the limitation period in a product liability action 
commences when the plaintiff is aware of the harm done and the fact 
that a product caused that harm. 
C. Even If One Assumes That the Statute is Ambiguous, the Utah 
Product Liability Act Reflects the Legislature's Intent to 
Restrict, Rather than to Expand, a Manufacturer's Liability in a 
Product Liability Action. 
If a statute is susceptible to different interpretations, 
the Court must choose the meaning which best harmonizes with the 
legislative intent and purpose. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 
608 P. 2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). Even if this Court were to assume 
that the terms of the two year limitation are ambiguous, the 
history and provisions of the Utah Product Liability Act demon-
strate the legislature's intent to restrict, rather than to expand, 
an individual's opportunity to bring an action against a product 
manufacturer. 
The Utah Manufacturers Association sponsored the Utah 
Product Liability Act. (Berry v. Beach Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 681 
(Utah 1985). The act included provisions which significantly 
limited the plaintiff's right to bring a product liability 
action—(1) a statute of repose, (2) a provision restricting the 
plaintiff's right to include a specific figure in the plaintiff's 
prayer for damages, (3) definitions of the terms "defect" and 
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"unreasonably dangerous," and (4) a rebuttable presumption of non-
defectiveness if the product complied with government standards. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court declared the entire Utah 
Product Liability Act unconstitutional in Berry v. Beach Aircraft, 
717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985), the Utah Legislature resurrected the act 
in 1989 by substituting the two year limitation statute for the 
statute of repose which the Supreme Court had invalidated. 
Obviously, the legislature's action in revitalizing the act bespoke 
the legislature's intent to again reimpose limitations on a 
plaintiff's right to bring an action against a product manufac-
turer. Given this history, it is apparent that if the language of 
the limitation is ambiguous, the Court must adopt the meaning 
consistent with the legislature's intent to restrict a plaintiff's 
cause against a manufacturer. 
D. The Utah Legislature's Intent Is Clearly Distinguishable from 
that of the Washington Legislature as Interpreted by the Washington 
Courts. 
Of all the cases cited by Aragon in support of his 
argument that the term "cause" includes the identity of the 
manufacturer, only one, Orear v. International Paint Co. , 796 P. 2d 
759 (Wash. App. 1990), purports to interpret a statute with 
language similar—but not identical—to the Utah Product Liability 
Act. However, the issue of legislative intent sharply differen-
tiates the Washington statute from the Utah statute. 
In Orear, the Washington Court of Appeals interpreted RCW 
7.72.060(3) which provides that a product liability claim accrues 
when "the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due diligence 
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should have discovered the harm and its cause." (As noted above, 
the Utah statute prefaces the word "harm" with the word "both.") 
The appellate court based its interpretation of the Washington act 
on a previous Washington Supreme Court decision. In that decision, 
the supreme court had held that the term "cause" as used in the 
statute was ambiguous and that it was appropriate to give the term 
a liberal meaning since the Washington Legislature had expressly 
declared that "its intent was to not unduly impair a claimant's 
right to recover." Orear, 796 P. 2d at 763. Once the court in 
Orear had determined that it was appropriate to interpret the 
statute liberally, it held that the identity of the product 
manufacturer was part of the "cause" of the harm. Although the 
Washington Legislature may have declared its intent not to impair a 
claimant's right to recover, the same cannot be said of the Utah 
Legislature. 
E. The More Restrictive Interpretation Achieves an Appropriate 
Balance Between Competing Objectives. 
In Myers v. McDonald, 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court noted the primary objective of a limitation statute: 
The governing policy in this area, as declared 
by the United States Supreme Court, is that 
statutes of limitations "are designed to 
promote justice by preventing surprises through 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to 
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories 
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." 
[Citing Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 
348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944)] 
Myers, 635 P.2d 86. Having stated the primary objective, the court 
judicially imposed a discovery rule in view of the facts of that 
12 
case. In reaching its decision, the court considered an Illinois 
case and noted that in any situation requiring the discovery rule, 
a balancing of interests is necessary: 
This application of the discovery rule was 
apparently based on a balancing test. The 
hardship the statute of limitations would 
impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances of 
that case outweighed any prejudice to the 
defendant from difficulties of proof caused by 
the passage of time. 
Myers, 635 P.2d 87. 
In the case of the Utah Product Liability Act, the 
balance has been struck as follows. The period begins when a 
person is aware he or she has been injured and is aware that a 
product has caused the injury. This measure accommodates the 
interest of a person with a latent injury which may not manifest 
itself immediately or the interest of an individual who is aware of 
an injury but is not immediately aware that a product was the 
source of that injury. Accordingly, until the individual is aware 
of the harm and its source, the manufacturer's interest is put in 
abeyance. However, once the injured person is on notice that he or 
she must act to pursue a remedy, the law protects the manufac-
turer's interest in not having to defend stale claims. 
The Illinois Appellate Court has well expressed the 
reasons why knowledge of the identity of a tort feasor is not a 
factor in the balancing of these interests. In Guebard v. Jabaav, 
381 N.E.2d 1164 (111. App. 1978), the plaintiff had brought a 
malpractice action against his personal physician and a hospital, 
claiming that the physician had negligently performed surgery on 
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his knee. The plaintiff learned after the limitation period had 
expired that a resident physician had actually performed the 
surgery• Plaintiff amended his complaint to include the resident, 
and the resident physician obtained summary judgment. On appeal, 
the plaintiff claimed that the discovery rule permitted the late 
amendment of his complaint. In refuting these contentions, the 
Illinois court stated: 
In applying the discovery rule, the court will 
balance the hardship on the plaintiff caused by 
the bar of his suit against the increased 
burden of a defendant to obtain proof of his 
defense after the passage of time. The 
hardship imposed upon a party who is unaware he 
had an actionable injury until after the 
limitations period has run is much more severe 
than that imposed upon a party who knows, or 
reasonably should know, he has suffered an 
actionable injury but does not learn the 
identity of the person who injured him until 
after the limitations period has passed. The 
former is in no position to take advantage of 
the limitations period in which to determine 
the identity of the party injuring him. The 
latter, however, knows he has a cause of 
action, has the time given by the limitations 
period to attempt to learn the identity of the 
person who injured him and is not in the 
position of being barred before ever knowing of 
his right to sue. We find no basis upon which 
the extension of the discovery rule urged by 
plaintiff could be applied in this case. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Guebard. 381 N.E.2d 1167. 
The Massachusetts Appellate Court reached a similar 
result in Krasnow v. Allen, 562 N.E.2d 1375 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). 
In Krasnow, a decedent's husband filed a wrongful death action 
against a psychiatrist who, unknown to the plaintiff, was an 
employee of a public entity. After learning the identity of the 
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psychiatrist's employer, the plaintiff amended his complaint to 
include the public entity. The amended complaint was dismissed due 
to the plaintiff's failure to give timely notice of his claim. In 
addressing the plaintiff's contention that the discovery rule 
should postpone the commencement of the limitation period, the 
Massachusetts court stated: 
Determining how far to extend the discovery 
rule requires a balancing between competing 
policies: the policy of fairness to claimants 
who may have incomplete knowledge of the facts 
giving rise to their claim, which underlies the 
discovery rule; and the policies of repose and 
fairness to defendants, who may be disadvan-
taged by delay in defending themselves, which 
underlie time limitations on litigation. That 
balance seems to have been struck in Massachu-
setts in favor of a somewhat more limited 
discovery rule than exists in many other 
jurisdictions. In light of that reality, as 
well as the federal guidance, we decline to 
extend the rule to the facts of this case. The 
plaintiff knew of the harm and of Dr. Allen's 
likely causal involvement in October of 1979. 
From then on the claim against Dr. Allen's 
public employer, assuming Dr. Allen could be 
found to be a Commonwealth employee, was not 
inherently unknowable. The plaintiff's 
knowledge was sufficient to stimulate further 
inquiry on his part about the claim, including 
inquiry into the facts about Dr. Allen's 
employment status, and, thus, to start the 
running of the clock. [Citations omitted.] 
Krasnow, 562 N.E.2d 1380. 
It is apparent why the Utah Legislature would not include 
notice of the manufacturer's identity as an element necessary to 
commence the limitation period. A limitation statute requires 
diligence. Once a person is on notice that he or she has been 
injured and that a product has caused the injury, it is the injured 
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person's burden to diligently search for the identity of the 
manufacturer and file his action before the evidence grows stale. 
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THIS COURT TO MANDATE A 
COMMON LAW REQUIREMENT THAT A LIMITATION BE 
TOLLED UNTIL A PLAINTIFF KNOWS THE IDENTITY OF 
A PRODUCT'S MANUFACTURER. 
As discussed in Point I, the Utah Product Liability Act 
limitation does not include the condition Aragon seeks. There is 
no reason for this Court to imply such a condition as a matter of 
common law. 
In Becton Dickinson and Company v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court restated the basic rule regard-
ing limitation statutes and listed those circumstances justifying 
the "discovery rule:11 
The policy heretofore adopted by this Court is 
that statutes of limitations "are designed to 
promote justice by preventing surprises through 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to 
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories 
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." 
To further that policy, the general rule has 
been that a cause of action accrues upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action. Under that 
general rule, "mere ignorance of the existence 
of a cause of action does not prevent the 
running of the statute of limitations." 
There are several exceptions to this general 
rule in Utah. In some areas of the law, the 
discovery rule is incorporated into the statute 
whereby the statute does not begin to run until 
the facts forming the basis for the cause of 
action are discovered. In other circumstances, 
concealment or misleading by a party prevents 
that party from relying on the statute of 
limitations. Finally, where there are excep-
tional circumstances that would make applica-
tion of the general rule irrational or unjust, 
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this Court has adopted the discovery rule by 
judicial action. [Citations omitted.] 
Becton Dickinson, 668 P. 2d at 1257. The three exceptions to the 
general rule are (1) statutory mandate, (2) concealment, and 
(3) inequity. As discussed above, the Utah Product Liability Act 
does not require knowledge of the manufacturer's identity. Under 
the circumstances of this case, Aragon cannot resort to the other 
two exceptions for a common law tolling of the limitation period. 
Becton Dickinson provides guidance as to when concealment or 
injustice would call for application of the discovery rule. 
A. Concealment Does Not Provide a Basis for Requiring Knowledge 
of the Manufacturer's Identity. 
In Becton Dickinson, Reese, the defendant, had filed a 
counterclaim against Becton Dickinson, the assignee of certain 
patent rights, asserting that Becton Dickinson had unlawfully 
deprived Reese of benefits under the patent. Becton Dickinson's 
predecessor had filed the patent without naming Reese as an 
inventor. When Becton Dickinson asserted the applicable limitation 
statute as an affirmative defense, Reese sought protection under 
the discovery rule. 
Although Becton Dickinson's predecessor had allegedly 
concealed from Reese the fact that Reese was not named on the 
patent, the supreme court nonetheless rejected application of the 
discovery rule as to Becton Dickinson, stating: 
Nor is this case premised on concealment of 
necessary facts or misleading of the defendant 
by the plaintiff. [Emphasis by the court.] 
* * * 
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Defendant makes no allegations Becton Dickinson 
either concealed the details of the patent from 
him or misled him in any way. 
Becton Dickinson, 668 P. 2d at 1257 and fn. 13. Here, even though 
Clover Club and Borden delayed their responses to Aragon's inqui-
ries for reasons known to them, their delay cannot be imputed to 
Casa Herrera. 
B. Nothing in the Circumstances of This Case Constitutes Excep-
tional Circumstances Which Would Make Application of the General 
Rule Irrational or Unjust. 
The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized the plaintiff's 
duty to diligently pursue information relative to the claim. In 
Becton Dickinson, Reese claimed the discovery rule applied to his 
situation since he was unaware he had been injured until he found 
that his name had been omitted from the patent. The supreme court 
rejected the argument stating: 
The patent here in question was issued on July 
27, 1975, almost five years before defendant 
filed his claim, and defendant admits he knew 
the patent had issued. In any event, due 
diligence on his part would have unearthed the 
inventor and his assignee as shown on the face 
of the patent. [Emphasis added.] 
Becton Dickinson, 668 P.2d at 1257. The thrust of the supreme 
court's holding is clear—a claimant is duty-bound to ascertain the 
facts when those facts are available. 
If anything Reese's claim to equity in Becton Dickinson 
was stronger than Aragon's position here. In Becton Dickinson, 
Reese claimed that he was unaware of the omission in the patent and 
that there was nothing to put him on notice that he should review 
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the patent. By contrast, Aragon was clearly on notice of his 
injury and its cause as of the day of the accident. Obviously, he 
knew he would have to identify the machine's manufacturer before 
filing an action. Yet, he made no effort to obtain this informa-
tion for nearly three years and ten months. The circumstances here 
are certainly not extraordinary. In light of the record, there is 
no injustice in this Court refusing to toll the limitation until 
Aragon discovered Casa Herrera's identity. 
III. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY PROVIDED DIRECTION 
REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE § 78-15-3 
TO PERSONS IN ARAGON'S SITUATION. 
Since Aragon is not entitled to a tolling of the limita-
tion based on his alleged ignorance of Casa Herrera's identity, the 
next issue the Court must address is the limitation applicable to 
Aragon7s claims. Casa Herrera maintains that the four year 
limitation of Utah Code § 78-12-25 applies. 
A. Evolution of Utah Product Liability Act Time Limitation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has left no doubt that when 
originally enacted, Utah Code § 78-15-3 (1977) was a statute of 
repose and not a statute of limitation. (See Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and Raithaus v. Saab-
Scandia of America, 784 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989)). The Utah Supreme 
Court declared the statute of repose unconstitutional in Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft, because the statute created a situation where a 
persons right of action was extinguished before it arose. In a 
1989 response to Berry, the Utah Legislature repealed the statute 
19 
of repose and enacted the present two year statute, effective April 
24, 1989. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 97 fn. 7 (Utah 
1991). 
B. The Legislature, Aware That Some Applications of the Statute 
Might Otherwise Be Unconstitutional, Declared Its Intent That the 
Limitation Did Not Apply to Persons in Mr. Aragon's Position. 
By its terms, the 1989 statute requires a plaintiff in a 
products liability action to file his or her complaint within two 
years after the plaintiff has discovered the harm and its cause. 
If this statute were applied to Aragon according to its literal 
terms, Aragon would have been required to file his complaint on or 
before December 16, 1987, a date which occurred long before the 
Legislature enacted the statute. The Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Toronto v. Sheffield, 222 P.2d 594, 596, 118 Utah 460 (1950) that: 
The Legislature may bar a claim within a 
reasonable time within the effective date of a 
statute enacted for the purpose, but may not 
constitutionally bar such claim without allow-
ing some time to elapse during which claimant 
may bring an action thereon after the effective 
date of the statute. 
The legislature foresaw possible constitutional problems with the 
statute's implementation and took measures to obviate the 
difficulties. 
Section 4 of the 1989 legislation amending the Utah 
Product Liability Act states: 
If any provision of this Act, or the applica-
tion of any provision to any person or circum-
stance
 f is held invalid, the remainder of this 
Act is given effect without the invalid 
provision or application. [Emphasis added.] 
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Chapter 119 of the Laws of Utah 1989. The legislature thus 
provided that the limitation would not be applied to persons whose 
rights would be cut off on a date prior to implementation of the 
statute• These persons were to be treated as though the limitation 
had not been enacted, and their claims would continue to be subject 
to the limitation governing the action prior to passage of the 
legislation. 
On the date of the accident, the general four year limi-
tation of Utah Code § 78-12-25(3) governed Aragon's claims. The 
legislative action nearly three and one-half years later had no 
effect on Aragon's claims. He had a full four years to file his 
action and his failure to timely file bars his claims against Casa 
Herrera. 
IV. EVEN IF THIS COURT ACCEPTS ARAGON'S INTERPRETATION 
OF THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT LIMITATION, HIS 
CLAIM IS NONETHELESS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
This Court has heretofore noted that it may affirm the 
trial court "if the trial court's decision can be sustained on any 
proper legal basis." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) . Even if this Court were to interpret the 
Utah Product Liability Act limitation as including the product 
manufacturer's identity, the Court should nonetheless affirm the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
Aragon maintains that he had two years from the time he 
actually discovered Casa Herrera's identity to file the action. 
Yet, the limitation states that a claimant has two years from the 
time the claimant discovered "or in the exercise of reasonable 
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diligence should have discovered" the requisite information. The 
undisputed facts demonstrate that Aragon should have discovered 
Casa Herrera's identity long before he allegedly did. 
In Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a discovery limitation embodied in Utah 
Code § 78-12-28(3) (1953). The supreme court held that the 
plaintiff's claims were barred as a matter of law despite the 
plaintiff's assertion that she was entitled to a trial to determine 
when she should have known of her cause of action. In response to 
the plaintiffs' argument, the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
The statute therefore permits an independent 
trial on the limitation issue. It is, however, 
like all other issues, subject to summary 
judgment if no genuine issues of material fact 
are raised. 
Reiser, 641 P. 2d at 99-100. Here, because the material facts are 
not in dispute, this Court can determine as a matter of law that 
even under Aragon's interpretation of the Utah Product Liability 
Act limitation, Aragon did not timely file his complaint against 
Casa Herrera. 
Aragon's problem does not actually arise from any diffi-
culty in obtaining Casa Herrera's identity. It is undisputed that 
once he initiated his inquiry, Aragon acquired the information 
within eight months. Aragon's problem arises from his failure to 
start the search for nearly three years and ten months after the 
accident. Surely, with due diligence, Aragon should have known of 
Casa Herrera's identity within two years after the accident—a 
period equivalent to the limitation itself. Even if the Court were 
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to grant Aragon a two-year discovery period as well as the two year 
limitation period (a total of four years) Aragon's complaint 
against Casa Herrera was untimely by ten months. 
CONCLUSION 
Aragon's construction of the Utah Product Liability Act 
limitation is untenable, because it does not accord with the 
legislature's intent as manifested by the statutory language and 
legislative history. Furthermore, the circumstances of this care 
are such that the Court should not imply a common law requirement 
that the statute be tolled until Aragon identified the product 
manufacturer. Hence, it is the four year limitation of Utah Code 
§ 78-12-25 which applies to this action. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, even if the Court were to determine that the identity of 
the manufacturer is a necessary prerequisite to the commencement of 
the limitation, Aragon's lack of due diligence precludes this 
action against Casa Herrera as a matter of law. Accordingly, Casa 
Herrera respectfully requests this Court to affirm the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment. 
DATED this o?7 ~ day of April, 1992. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Jay E. Jensen 
M. Douglas Bayly 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Casa Herrera, Inc. 
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APPENDIX B 
Utah Code § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 ( 3 ) 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-25 
78-12-24. Actions against public officers — Within six 
years. 
An action by the state or any agency or public corporation thereof against 
any public officer for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or 
against any surety upon his official bond may be brought within six years 
after such officer ceases to hold his office, but not thereafter. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Misconduct by public servants, §§ 76-8-201 
Supp., 104-12-24. et seq. 
Cross-References. — Governmental Immu-
nity Act, ^ 63-30-1 et seq. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 54 C J S. Limitations of Actions Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=» 
§ 33 et seq. 58(2) 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon 
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and 
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of 
Title 25, Chapter 6, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic 
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14. changes in Subsection (1). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions, 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted Subsec- § 76-10-925. 
tion (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Federal civil rights actions. 
Indemnity or guaranty bond. 
Constitutionality. Judgment hen. 
Assigned cause of action. Land contract. 
Breach of fiduciary duty. Malpractice. 
Conflict of laws. Mortgages. 
Damage of private property for public use Nuisances. 
Divorce actions. Open account. 
Excessive freight charges. Oral contract. 
Extension of period. Oral modification of written contract. 
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APPENDIX C 
Utah Code § 78-15-1 e t seq . 
78-14a-101 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-14a-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter, "therapist" means: 
(1) a psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine under Sections 58-12-26 
through 58-12-43, the Utah Medical Practice Act; 
(2) a psychologist licensed to practice psychology under Title 58, Chap-
ter 25a; 
(3) a marriage and family therapist licensed to practice marriage and 
family therapy under Title 58, Chapter 39; 
(4) a social worker licensed to practice social work under Title 58, 
Chapter 35; and 
(5) a psychiatric and mental health nurse specialist licensed to practice 
advanced psychiatric nursing under Title 58, Chapter 31. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14a-101, enacted by 12, Title 58" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter 
L. 1988, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch. 42, § 15. 25a" for "Chapter 25" in Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 89 be-
ment, effective July 1, 1989, substituted "Sec- came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to 
tions 58-12-26 through 58-12-43" for "Chapter Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-14a-102. Limitation of therapist's duty to warn. 
(1) A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protec-
tion from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client 
or patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence 
against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall 
be discharged if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the 
threat to the victim, and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the 
threat. 
(2) No cause of action arises against a therapist for breach of trust or privi-
lege, or for disclosure of confidential information, based on a therapist's com-
munication of information to a third party in an effort to discharge his duty in 
accordance with Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not limit or effect a therapist's duty to report child 
abuse or neglect in accordance with Section 62A-4-503. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14a-102, enacted by came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to 
L. 1988, ch. 89, § 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 89 be-
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PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT 78-15-1 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Product Liability 
Act." 
78-15-1. Short title of act. 
Historv: C. 1953, 78-15-1, enac ted by L. 
1977, ch. 149, § 1. 
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase this 
Constitutionality. 
The Utah Product Liability Act is unconsti-
tutional. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Utah Law Review. — The Utah Product 
Liability Limitation of Action: An Unfair Reso-
lution of Competing Concerns, 1979 Utah L. 
Rev. 149. 
Strict Products Liability in Utah Following 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 1980 
Utah L. Rev. 577. 
Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons 
in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 
3. 
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the 
Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L. 
Rev. 495, 496. 
Mulherin v. Ingersolh Utah Adopts Compar-
ative Principles in Strict Products Liability 
Cases, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 461. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Used 
Products and Strict Liability: A Practical Ap-
proach to a Complex Problem, 1981 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 154. 
The Merger of Comparative Fault Principles 
with Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. Ing-
ersoll-Rand Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964. 
A.L.R. — Handgun manufacturer's or 
seller's liability for injuries caused to another 
by use of gun in committing crime, 44 
A.L.R.4th 595. 
Products liability: construction materials or 
insulation containing formaldehyde, 45 
A.L.R.4th 751. 
Products liability: liability of manufacturer 
or seller as affected by failure of subsequent 
party in distribution chain to remedy or warn 
against defect of which he knew, 45 A.L.R.4th 
777. 
Products liability: perfumes, colognes, or 
deodorants, 46 A.L.R.4th 1197. 
Products liability: admissibility of defen-
dant's evidence of industry custom or practice 
in strict liability action, 47 A.L.R.4th 621. 
Future disease or condition, or anxiety relat-
ing thereto, as element of recovery, 50 
A.L.R.4th 13. 
act" means Laws 1977, ch. 149, which enacted 
this chapter. 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (but see note 
under this catchline following § 78-15-3). 
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to 
support product misuse defense in actions con-
cerning athletic, exercise, or recreational 
equipment, 50 A.L.R.4th 1226. 
Products liability: admissibility of evidence 
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th 
1186. 
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to 
support product misuse defense in actions con-
cerning wearing apparel, 52 A.L.R.4th 276. 
Attorneys' fees in products liability suits, 53 
A.L.R.4th 414. 
Products liability: personal soap, 54 
A.L.R.4th 574. 
Duty and liability of subcontractor to em-
ployee of another contractor using equipment 
or apparatus of former, 55 A.L.R.4th 725. 
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to 
support product misuse defense in actions, con-
cerning electrical generation and transmission 
equipment, 55 A.L.R.4th 1010. 
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to 
support product misuse defense in actions con-
cerning lawnmowers, 55 A.L.R.4th 1062. 
Products liability: pertussis vaccine manu-
facturers, 57 A.L.R.4th 911. 
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to 
support product misuse defense in actions con-
cerning food, drugs, and other products in-
tended for ingestion, 58 A.L.R.4th 7. 
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to 
support product misuse defense in actions con-
cerning cosmetics and other personal care 
products, 58 A.L.R.4th 40. 
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to 
support product misuse defense in actions con-
cerning paint, cleaners, or other chemicals, 58 
A.L.R.4th 76. 
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to 
support product misuse defense in actions con-
cerning gas and electric appliances, 58 
A.L.R.4th 131. 
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT 78-15-4 
73-15-2, Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 119, § 3 repeals 
; 78-15-2, as enacted by L. 1977, ch. 149, § 2, 
containing legislative findings and declara-
tions and stating the purpose of the chapter, 
effective April 24, 1989. 
78-15-3. Statute of limitations. 
A civil action under this chapter shall be brought within two years from the 
time the individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered, or in 
the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its 
cause. 
History: C. 1953, 78-15-3, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 119, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1989, 
ch. 119, ^ 1 repeals former § 78-15-3, as en-
acted by L. 1977, ch. 149, § 3, providing a stat-
ute of limitations, and enacts the present sec-
tion, effective April 24, 1989. 
Cross-References. — Effect of disability on 
limitations generally, § 78-12-36. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Former statute. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Former section was held unconstitutional 
and chapter invalid accordingly in Berry ex 
rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985). 
Former statute. 
Six-year time period in former version of this 
section was a statute of repose and could not 
therefore function as a statute of limitations. 
Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of Am., Inc., 784 
P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989). 
Cited in Whitehead v. American Motors 
Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When cause of action arises on ac-
tion against manufacturer or seller of product 
causing injury or death, 4 A.L.R.3d 821. 
Running of statute of limitations on products 
liability claim against manufacturer as af-
fected by plaintiffs lack of knowledge of defect 
allegedly causing personal injury or disease, 91 
A.L.R.3d 991. 
What statute of limitations applies to actions 
for personal injuries based on breach of implied 
warranty under UCC provisions governing 
sales, 20 A.L.R.4th 915. 
Validity and construction of statute termi-
nating right of action for product-caused injury 
at fixed period after manufacture, sale, or de-
livery, 25 A.L.R.4th 641. 
Liability of auctioneer under doctrine of 
strict products liability, 83 A.L.R.4th 1188. 
78-15-4. Prayer for damages. 
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed in a 
product liability action against a product manufacturer, wholesaler or re-
tailer. The complaint shall merely pray for such damages as are reasonable in 
the premises. 
History: C. 1953, 78-15-4, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 149, § 4. 
Cross-References. — Claim in complaint of 
interest on special damages in personal injury 
action, § 78-27-44. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Allowance of punitive damages, 13 
A.L.R.4th 52. 
Consequential loss of profits from injury to 
property as element of damages in products lia-
bility, 89 A.L.R.4th 11. 
78-15-5. Alteration or modification of product after sale as 
substantial contributing cause — Manufacturer 
or seller not liable. 
For purposes of Section 78-27-38, fault shall include an alteration or modifi-
cation of the product, which occurred subsequent to the sale by the manufac-
turer or seller to the initial user or consumer, and which changed the purpose, 
use, function, design, or intended use or manner of use of the product from 
that for which the product was originally designed, tested, or intended. 
History: C. 1953, 78-15-5, enac ted by L. 
1977, ch. 149, § 5; 1989, ch. 119, § 2. 
Amendmen t Notes . — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted "For 
purpose of Section 78-27-38, fault shall in-
clude" for "No manufacturer or seller of a prod-
uct shall be held liable for any injury, death or 
damage to property sustained as a result of an 
alleged defect, failure to warn or protect or fail-
ure to properly instruct, in the use or misuse of 
that product, where a substantial contributing 
cause of the injury, death or damage to prop-
erty was" at the beginning of the section and 
made minor stylistic changes. 
Severabil i ty Clauses . — Laws 1989, ch. 
119, § 4 provides that if any provision of the 
act, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the re-
mainder of the act is to be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application. 
Cross-References. — Comparative negli-
gence, §§ 78-27-37, 78-27-38. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Alteration or modification required. 
This section did not apply where there was 
no alteration or modification of the product 
which changed its purpose or use from that for 
which it was designed. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981). 
This section requires some sort of physical 
alteration or modification of the product itself 
which leaves the product in a different condi-
tion or form than it was in when it left the 
manufacturer's or seller's hands. Beacham v. 
Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Statute precluding or limiting re-
covery where product has been altered or modi-
fied after leaving hands of manufacturer or 
seller, 41 A.L.R.4th 47. 
Alteration of product after it leaves hands of 
manufacturer or seller as affecting liability for 
product-caused harm, 41 A.L.R.4th 1251. 
Products liability: product misuse defense, 
65 A.L.R.4th 263. 
Products liability: injury caused by product 
as a result of being tampered with, 67 
A.L.R.4th 964. 
Liability for injury or death allegedly caused 
by spoilage or contamination of beverage, 87 
A.L.R.4th 804. 
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78-15-6. Defect or defective condition making product un-
reasonably dangerous — Rebuttable presump-
tion. 
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage 
allegedly caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a defec-
tive condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the manufac-
turer or other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in 
the product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the prod-
uct was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by 
the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product in that 
community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, 
dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge, training, or experi-
ence possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any 
defect or defective condition where the alleged defect in the plans or 
designs for the product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing, 
inspecting and testing the product were in conformity with government 
standards established for that industry which were in existence at the 
time the plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of 
manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were adopted. 
History: C. 1953, 78-15-6, enacted by L. act" in Subsection (2) means Laws 1977, Chap-
1977, ch. 149, § 6. ter 149, which enacted this chapter 
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Drugs. 
A drug approved by the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), properly pre-
pared, compounded, packaged, and distributed, 
cannot as a matter of law be "defective" in the 
absence of proof of inaccurate, incomplete, mis-
leading, or fraudulent information furnished 
by the manufacturer in connection with FDA 
AX.R. — Manufacturer's duty to test or in-
spect as affecting his liability for product-
caused injury, 6 A L.R.3d 12. 
Liability of owner or operator of self-service 
laundry for personal injury or damages to pa-
tron or frequenter of premises from defect in 
premises or appliances, 23 A.L.R.3d 1246. 
Extension of strict liability in tort to permit 
recovery by third person who was neither pur-
chaser nor user of product, 33 A.L.R 3d 415. 
Liability of product endorser or certifier for 
product-caused injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 181. 
Liability of owner or operator of motor vehi-
approval. Grundberg v Upjohn Co , 813 P 2d 
89 (Utah 1991) 
A broad grant of immunity from strict liabil-
ity claims based on design defects should be 
extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs 
in Utah. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P 2d 89 
(Utah 1991). 
cle for injury, death, or property damage re-
sulting from defective brakes, 40 A L R.3d 9 
Liability of one selling or distributing liquid 
or bottled fuel gas, for personal injury, death, 
or property damage, 41 A L.R.3d 782. 
Liability of manufacturer or seller of power 
lawnmower for injuries to user, 41 A.L R.3d 
986. 
Necessity and sufficiency of identification of 
defendant as manufacturer or seller of product 
alleged to have caused injury, 51 A.L.R.3d 
1344. 
Failure to warn as basis of liability under 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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APPENDIX D 
Memorandum Decision 
AUS 0 5 1991 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES M. ARAGON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS, et al., ] 
Defendants. ] 
| RULING ON MOTION 
1 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I Civil No. 900747717 
The defendants' motions for summary judgment came before the 
Court on a notice to submit for decision. The Court has 
received written memoranda from the defendants in support of 
their motions for summary judgment and from the plaintiff in 
opposition. The plaintiff is represented by Douglas M. Durbano 
and Paul H. Johnson and the defendants by Allan T. Brinkerhoff 
and Steven W. Call for Clover Club Foods Company and Borden, 
Inc., along with Jay E. Jensen for Casa Herrera, Inc. 
Defendants7 two motions for summary judgment are granted. 
There are no genuine issues of material fact in either motion. 
The facts in the case are not complicated. Plaintiff James 
M. Aragon, ("Aragon") began working for Clover Club Foods 
Company ("Clover Club"), a subsidiary of Borden, Inc. 
("Borden"), on December 3, 1985. Aragon was assigned to clean a 
mesa feeder machine on his first day of work. Aragon cleaned 
the mesa feeder machine each day from December 3, 1985, through 
December 16, 1985. On December 16, 1985, Aragon began to clean 
the mesa feeder. Aragon suffered a double compound fracture to 
his left arm, having since undergone significant medical care 
and treatment. Aragon7s employers, Clover Club and Borden 
relied on an insurance premium and Worker's Compensation to 
cover Aragon's medical and disability expenses, Aragon sued his 
employers, claiming that Borden is a third party tortfeasor who 
acted negligently in supplying the mesa feeder machine to Clover 
Club. 
The issue in this case concerns whether defendants, Borden 
and Clover Club were the common law employers of Aragon under 
the Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-60 of the Worker's 
Compensation Act on December 16, 1985. If Clover Club and 
Borden were the common law employers of Aragon on December 16, 
1985, then Aragon7s exclusive remedy is confined to Worker's 
Compensation. However, if Clover Club and Borden were not the 
common law employers of Aragon on December 16, 1985, Aragon may 
attempt to sue Clover Club or Borden as a third party tortfeasor 
according to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62(a) of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. 
The Utah Supreme Court clarified the plain meaning of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-60 of the Worker's Compensation 
Act, on back-to-back cases in 1989. In Pate v. Marathon Steel 
Co., 777 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
deemed the legislative language of Section 35-1-60 to be clear 
and unequivocal. The language of Section 35-1-60 permits suits 
by injured workers against statutory employers but not immediate 
common law employers. Id. The Pate court defined a common law 
employer as the on£ who actually pays the wages of the 
employee. Id. 
In the second case decided on the same date, Bosch v. Bursch 
Development, Inc., 777 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court further defined what constitutes a common law 
employer. A common law employer is required to pay the 
employee's Worker's Compensation benefits. Id. at 432. An 
employer who does not pay the employee's Worker's Compensation 
benefits is deemed a statutory employer. Id. A statutory 
employer who fails to pay the employee's Worker's Compensation 
benefits is denied statutory immunity from an employee's suit as 
provided for in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42(2) of the 
Workers's Compensation Act, Id. 
The rule of law which clarifies Utah legislation in Pate and 
Bosch defines a common law employer as one who pays the 
employee's wages and Worker's Compensation benefits. Applying 
this common law employer rule to the facts in the instant case, 
Clover Club and Borden constitute a common law employer. On 
December 17, 1985, Aragon submitted his initial worker's 
compensation claim to his employer's claims adjuster. The claim 
prepared by Aragon listed both defendants Clover Club and Borden 
as his employers. The insurance carrier which handles claims 
for Clover Club and Borden listed both Clover Club and Borden as 
Aragon's employers in filing an answer to the Utah State 
Industrial Commission on September 2, 1986. Lastly, Aragon's 
final compensation agreement approved by an administrative law 
judge on August 14, 1987, for the Utah State Industrial 
Commission listed both Clover Club and Borden as Aragon's 
employers. The administrative law judge ordered Clover Club and 
Borden, as Aragon's employers, to pay disability wages of more 
than $16,000 and medical expenses in excess of $45,000 to 
Aragon. Thus, for having paid Aragon's wages and Worker's 
Compensation benefits, both Clover Club and Borden constitute 
the common law employers of Aragon. 
Because Clover Club and Borden are Aragon's common law 
employers, Aragon is limited to the exclusive remedy of Utah 
Code Annotated of the Worker's Compensation Act as provided for 
in Section 35-1-60. Since Aragon already has received wages and 
medical expenses as his remedy from the Utah State Industrial 
Commission, no factual issue remains. To permit Aragon to 
continue to seek relief from his employers, Clover Club and 
Borden, would preclude a finality to litigation. More 
significantly, plaintiff's employer is entitled to relief on the 
basis of res judicata. The matter already has been adjudicated. 
Aragon, while conceding no genuine fact is materially 
disputed, nonetheless argues that the undisputed facts are 
subject to divergent interpretations. On the basis of such 
divergent interpretations, the motion for summary judgment by 
Clover Club and Borden, should be denied. However, no 
reasonable inference other than that Clover Club and Borden 
acted as Aragon's common law employer can be drawn from the 
facts. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court in Helgar Ranch, 
Inc. v. Stillmen, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980), made clear 
that a motion for summary judgment is denied only when a 
material fact is genuinely controverted. No facts in the 
instant case are uncontroverted by either party. For example, 
Aragon received a letter from Clover Club in May 20, 1987, that 
contained an offer to buy health insurance from Borden. 
Throughout the letter, Clover Club made clear that the insurance 
offer came from Borden. This May 20, 1987, letter was supplied 
by Aragon. Aragon kenw or had reason to know that both Clover 
Club and Borden had acted as his employers. 
The tangential question of piercing the corporate veil need 
not be addressed. The Utah Supreme Court in Page and Bosch made 
clear that the sole question on whether Clover Club or Borden 
are third party tortfeasors or the employee's common law 
employers turns on whether the defendants pay the employee's 
wages and Worker's Compensation benefits. The facts in this 
case clearly indicate that Clover Club and Borden are common law 
employers and further actions by Aragon is barred. Thus, as a 
matter of law, the motion for summary judgment, made by Clover 
Club and Borden is granted. 
Regarding the motion for summary judgment made by defendant, 
Casa Herrera, Inc., the facts are uncontroverted. James Aragon 
sustained a serious injury on December 16, 1985, while cleaning 
a mesa feeder at Clover Club in Davis County. Aragon commenced 
a cause of action against Casa Herrera on September 24, 1990. 
In other words, Aragon did not exercise his right to seek a 
remedy against Casa Herrera, Inc., until approximately four and 
three-fourth years after he sustained serious injuries while 
working at Clover Club. 
The lapse of more than four years in filing a complaint 
raises the question as to what statutory section governs the 
commencing of a personal injury tort action. Aragon claims to 
have six years to file from the date of purchase of the 
allegedly defective machine or up to ten years from the date of 
manufacture. Aragon relies on Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-15-3 which in fact provided from six to ten years for filing 
a complaint. However, the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 727 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985) found Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-15-3 to be a statute of repose. Id. at 
672. A statute of repose is per se unconstitutional for 
violating Article I, Section 11 of the Utah State 
Constitution. Id. The Berry court reasoned that Section 
78-15-3 would deny a plaintiff a cause of action merely because 
the plane which had crashed and caused the death of its 
passengers was more than ten years old. Id. Any statute that 
bars a plaintiff a cause of action without regard to when the 
injury occurs is a statute of repose and hence 
unconstitutional. Id. at 679. Thus, Aragon may not use a 
statute of repose as a basis for determining when his right of 
action may toll. 
Casa Herrera, Inc., correctly refers to Utah Code, Section 
78-12-25 (1953 & Supp. 1975), for determining when a cause of 
action tolls. Section 78-12-25, in effect in 1985, covers tort 
actions for personal injuries and grants plaintiffs up to four 
years to file a complaint with the courts. Section 78-12-25 
meets the constitutional requirements set out by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Berry. For, the section takes into account 
when the injury occurs as a basis for determining how long a 
plaintiff has to file a cause of action. 
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its Berry litmus test for 
determining the constitutionality of statute code sections in 
Riathaus v. Saab-Scandia of America, 789 P. 2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 
1989) . The Riathaus court noted how statutes of limitations 
prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights to the 
detriment of defendants. Id. at 1160. As a statute of 
limitation, Section 78-12-25 gives plaintiff four years to 
commence a cause of action. 
Applying the Berry and Riathaus holdings along with the 
proper code Section 78-12-25 to the instant case, Aragon was 
injured on Decmeber 16, 1985. Aragon sued Casa Herrera, Inc., 
on September 24, 1990, which exceeds the statutory limit by 
approximately nine months. Aragon's suit against defendant Casa 
Herrera, Inc., is time barred. As a matter of law, then Casa 
Herrera, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is granted. 
The defendants, Clover Club and Borden, are ordered to draw 
a formal order based on this opinion. 
Dated July 31, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: x 
- <s 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to: 
Paul H. Johnson 
Douglas M. Durbano 
3340 Harrison Blvd., #200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Allan T. Brinkerhoff 
Steven W. Call 
310 So Main St, 12th Floor 
SLC, Utah 84101 
Jay E. Jensen 
M. Douglas Bayly 
175 So West Temple, Suite 510 
SLC, Utah 84101 
Dated this ,X/?d day of August 1991, 
<a/•/,,, nJt) 
Deputy Clerk 
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October 22, 1991 Ruling 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ""' "° • w' °'-
IN AND FOR THE . . . 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH •• _ 
JAMES M. ARAGON, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
CLOVER CLUB, et al., ] 
Defendants. ; 
I RULING ON MOTION 
I FOR RECONSIDERATION 
| Civil No. 900747717 
The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration came before th 
Court for oral argument on October 22, 1991, with Douglas M 
Durbano appearing for the plaintiff and M. Douglas Bayl 
appearing for the defendant. After oral argument the Court too 
the motion under advisement. 
The defendant, Casa Herrera, presents two basic arguments 
First, the Court should not grant a Rule 59 motion premised o 
an argument which could and should have been presented at th< 
initial hearing. Second, plaintiff's argument is contrary t< 
the legislative intent in enacting the Utah Product Liabilit; 
Act. 
As to the first argument, this Court believes that a review 
is at times more efficient than an appeal. 
This Court has not been persuaded that it was wrong in it: 
original ruling of July 31, 1991. The Court will, however 
reflect further on the case. 
The now products liability statute, Utah Code 78-15-3 limit! 
actions to those "brought within two years from the time th< 
individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered 
or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, botl 
the harm and its cause.11 In this case, James M. Aragoi 
discovered both "the harm" and "its cause" on December 16, 1985 
the day of the accident. The harm was the injury to his ar^  
The cause was the machine used by Clover Club Foods Compar.v 
The plaintiff cited to the Court Qrear v. International Pa;-
Co. , 796 P.2d 756 (Wash. App. 1990). This case involved > 
statute similar to the Utah statute, but the Washington cour. 
added an additional element. "A person injured by a defective 
product simply cannot be said to have discovered the cause el 
injury in a legally enforceable sense until he or she discovers 
who manufactured or supplied the product or is otherwise 
responsible for the injury." (page 764). The plaintiff argues 
that it conceivably could require several years beyond the 
statutory two years to learn the name of the responsible 
manufacturer. It is almost like saying the statutory two years 
is meaningless. 
This Court believes that under the new Utah statute if the 
plaintiff commenced the suit within two years, he would have had 
a "reasonable" time to discover the name of the manufacturer and 
make him a party to the action. In actual fact, the plaintiff 
did not file this suit until May 11, 1990, four years and five 
months after the injury. That time frame is not within the 
spirit of either the old law or the new law. 
The motion to set aside the granting of summary judgment in 
favor of Casa Herrera is denied. 
Defendant, Casa Herrera is directed to draw a formal order 
based on this ruling. 
Dated October 23, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judg^7 
APPENDIX F 
November 13 , 1991 Orde r 
r1" '"'; * •: - _.: ? j 
Jay E. Jensen, #167 6 
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251 -. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Casa Herrera 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES M. ARAGON, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
V • J 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a j 
Utah corporation, BORDEN, INC., 
a New Jersey corporation, ] 
CASA HERRERA, INC., a California 
corporation, and JOHN DOES 
I through X, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
I ORDER 
) Civil 
• Judge 
AND JUDGMENT 
No. 900747717 PI 
Douglas L. Cornaby 
This matter came before the Court on defendants' motions 
for summary judgment and plaintiff's objection and motion for nev 
trial or to alter or amend judgment. 
A hearing on defendants' motions for summary judgment 
was held on July 23, 1991. Plaintiff was represented by Douglas 
M. Durbano, Esq. and Paul Johnson, Esq. Borden and Clover Clul 
were represented by Allan T. Brinkerhoff and Steven W. Call Esq, 
Casa Herrera was represented by M. Douglas Bayly, Esq. 
The Court, having considered the matter fully, signec 
and entered a Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment dated Jul} 
31, 1991, granting both motions, which was served on counsel foi 
1
 0055581 
FILMED 
the parties by mail on August 2, 1991. Counsel for defendants 
Clover Club Foods Company and Borden, Inc. prepared and served a 
proposed Order and Judgment on August 6, 1991. 
The plaintiff subsequently filed an objection to the 
proposed order and a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the 
judgment as to the Court's ruling on Casa Herrera's motion. The 
Court heard arguments on plaintiff's objection and motion on 
October 22, 1991. Douglas M. Durbano, Esq. appeared on behalf of 
the plaintiff, and M. Douglas Bayly, Esq. appeared on behalf of 
defendant Casa Herrera. The Court, having considered plaintiff's 
arguments, signed and entered a Ruling on Motion for Reconsidera-
tion dated October 23, 1991 denying plaintiff's motion. 
With good cause now appearing, the Court enters the 
following judgment and order pursuant to Rule 58A(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Summary Judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
defendants Borden, Inc. and Clover Club Foods Company and against 
plaintiff James M. Aragon for the reasons set forth in this 
Court's Ruling dated July 31, 1991. 
2. Summary Judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
defendant Casa Herrera, Inc. and against plaintiff James M. Aragon 
for the reasons set forth in this Court's Ruling dated July 31, 
1991. 
2 
3. Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Order and 
Judgment and Motion for a New Trial or to Alter or Amend Judgment 
is hereby denied for the reasons set forth in this Court's Ruling 
dated October 23, 1991. 
4. The action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED AND ENTERED this /3 day of S/'f"n/-'r- 1991. 
BY THECOURT: 
r^// ^_ 
Dougla«--I^ r Cornaby 
District Judge 
0055583 
APPENDIX G 
Notice of Appeal dated November 13, 1991 
DEO IS 1391 
Douglas M. Durbano (#4209) 
Paul H. Johnson (#4856) 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3340 Harrison Boulevard, #200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 621-4111 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES M. ARAGON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; BORDEN, INC., a New 
Jersey corporation, CASA HERRERRA, 
INC., a California Corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I thru X, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 900747717PI 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff in the above entitled 
matter, James M. Aragon, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah from the Order and Judgment granting Summary 
Judgment to Defendants Clover Club Foods Company, Borden, Inc., 
and Casa Herrerra, Inc., and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with 
prejudice, entered in this action on November 13, 1991, by the 
Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, State of Utah. 
DATED this 1L- day of December, 1991. 
DURB. & ASSOCIATES 
'/& 
Douglas M^tDurbano 
Paul H. Jphnson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the following: 
Jay E. Jensen, Esq. 
M. Douglas Bayly, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Defendant 
Casa Herrerra, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101 
Allan T. Brinkerhoff, Esq. 
Steven W. Call, Esq. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
Attorneys for Defendants Clover Club 
Foods Company and Borden, Inc. 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101 
l2t postage pre-paid on this //> day of December, 1991 
(l\pldgs\870570.) 
APPENDIX H 
October 5, 1989 Let ter 
D O U G L A S M. D U R B A N O 
ATTORNEY A T LAW 
UNITED SAVINGS PLAZA 
4185 HARRISON BOULEVARD • SUITE 320 
OGDEN. UTAH 84403 
TELEPHONE (801) 621-4111 
October 5/ 1989 
-CERTIFIED MAIL-
Borden, Inc. and/or 
Clover Club Poods Company 
C/0 Prentice Hall Corporate Systems 
Registered Coroorate Agent 
185 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: James Aragon 
My Pile: 87-0570 
NOTICE OP INTENT TO COMMENCE PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTION 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Please let this letter serve as formal notice, pursuant to 
the Utah Products Liability Act, U.C.A. Section 78-15-1/ et seg., 
that James M. Aragon intends to commence a oroducts liability 
action against the designers, manufacturers, owners and/or 
operators of a certain dough-mixing machine, which caused him 
personal injury while employed by Clover Club Foods Company, 
Kaysville, Utah, on or about December 16, 1985. 
The general nature of the claim is that on the above date, 
while in the course of his employment, James M. Aragon was 
operating for the first time the dough-mixing machine from which 
taco shells were made. Mr. Aragon had been working for Clover 
Club Poods only since December 3, 1985, and had received no 
instructions about the operation or cleaning of the dough-mixing 
machine. At approximately 4:15 p.m., he shut the, machine off, 
but was then instructed by his supervisor to plug the machine 
back in and to clean it. Aragon turned the machine on, letting 
it operate for a few minutes. Then, he walked up the three steps 
next to the machine to look in the top of the machine to see if 
the dough was churned out of it. While ascending these steps he 
slipped on some grease covering the steps. He grabbed hold of 
the edge of the dough-mixing machine in an attempt to steady 
himself, whereupon the paddle at the top of the machine, which 
pushed dough down into the auger at the bottom of the machine, 
swept his left, hand and arm into the machine. It took paramedics 
approximately one hour to free Mr. Aragon1s arm and hand from the 
machine. 
As a result of the accident, Mr. Aragon sustained to his 
BUSH A 
•<?L *3 
1* 
NOTICE OF INTENT 
October 5, 1989 
Page 2 
left arm and hand significant damage, open fractures of the 
radius and ulna bones, and nerve damage to the ulnar nerve. 
Although there has been some improvement following several 
surgeries and almost 4 years of recovery/ Mr. Aragon continues to 
have a permanent partial disability and impairment based upon 
loss of function and range of motion in his upper extremity, his 
left arm and hand, equivalent to 41%. The 41% impairment to such 
upper extremity translates to a 25% impairment to the whole 
person. 
With the cooperation of Clover 
Borden, Inc. in obtaining information 
machine involved in this accident, it 
Clover Club nor Borden would suffer any 
cooperation, however, both Clover Club 
be named as co-defendants. Therefore, 
cooperate with us in obtaining this information, to everyone's 
mutual benefit. If you have any questions or comments regarding 
this matter, please have your legal counsel, insurance company or 
other representative contact me as soon as possible. 
Club Foods Company and 
about the dough-mixing 
is possible that neither 
liability. Without such 
and Borden would need to 
I would hope you would 
This Notice is given this ber, 1989. 
DOUGLAS 
Attorne 
DORBANO 
or James M« Aragon 
DMD/nac 
APPENDIX I 
Affidavit of Paul Johnson 
'-e i i m 
Douglas M. Durbano (#4209) 
Paul H. Johnson (#4856) 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3340 Harrison Boulevard, #200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 621-4111 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES M. ARAGON, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF 
: PAUL H. JOHNSON 
vs. 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; BORDEN, INC., a New : 
Jersey corporation, CASA HERRERRA, 
INC., a California Corporation, : Civil No. 900747717PI 
and JOHN DOES I thru X, inclusive, 
: Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
Paul H. Johnson, being first duly sworn upon his oath 
deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 21 and competent to be a witness 
herein, and as attorney for the Plaintiff in this matter, I am 
personally familiar with this matter, and all statements made 
herein are made upon personal knowledge, unless otherwise stated 
that such statement is upon information and belief. 
2. On October 6, 1989, the Plaintiff sent a Notice of Intent 
to Commence Product Liability Action to Borden, Inc. (hereinafter 
" Borden") and Clover Club Foods Company (hereinafter "Clover 
Club"). A copy of such Notice of Intent to Commence Product 
Liability Action is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." In such 
Notice, the Plaintiff requested information from Clover Club or 
Borden concerning the manufacturer of the masa feeder machine. 
Plaintiff stated in such notice that if Borden and Clover Club 
cooperated with the Plaintiff in ascertaining the manufacturer of 
the subject masa feeder machine, the Plaintiff would be inclined 
to refrain from naming either Clover Club or Borden as a party to 
the action. 
5. Because Clover Club and Borden did not cooperate 
with the Plaintiff in providing the Plaintiff with the name of the 
manufacturer of the subject masa feeder machine, on November 10, 
1989, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages in Federal 
District Court for the Northern District of Utah. Such complaint 
listed Clover Club, Borden and John Does I through X as party 
defendants. It was recognized by both parties that the Federal 
District Court would have diversity jurisdiction in this case, if 
the parties could agree to dismiss Clover Club from the action. 
Because the parties could not agree to dismiss Clover Club, and 
pursuant to motion by Clover Club and Borden, the Complaint in 
the Federal District Court was dismissed for lack of diversity 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL H. JOHNSON 
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jurisdiction on April 20, 1990. On May 11, 1990, the Plaintiff 
refiled his Complaint in the Second District Court, in and for 
Davis County, State of Utah, naming the same party defendants. 
6. Plaintiff originally served his First Set of Discovery 
on Clover Club and Borden on January 11, 1990, in the Federal 
District Court case. Although the Defendants, Borden and Clover 
Club, originally agreed to informally answer Plaintiff's discovery 
in the Federal case, they did not follow through on such promise. 
Following the dismissal of the Federal case for lack of 
jurisdiction and the refiling of Plaintiff's Complaint in State 
Court, Plaintiff again served Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery 
requests on Borden and Clover Club. Finally, on July 13, 1990, 
Clover Club's and Borden's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Discovery were received by Plaintiff. In such Answers, the 
Defendants identified the manufacturer of the subject masa feeder 
machine as Casa Herrerra, Inc. of 5860 South Mettler Street, Los 
Angeles, California. 
7. On August 14, 1990, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to 
name and join Casa Herrerra to the action as one of the "John Doe" 
defendants. On October 16, 1990, the Order granting leave to join 
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Casa Herrerra to the action as a party defendant was entered. On 
November 8, 1990, Casa Herrerra was served with a Summons and 
Complaint in this matter. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this day of August, 1991. 
<Ui^n~ 
Paul H. Johnson 
Sv/orn tor and subscribed before me this A9" w day of 
U&T . 1991. A 
Residing in: OfldtA , . 
My Commission Expires'-~&fcfo 
P u b l i c 
NOTARY 1'UBLIC 
JANETTE SNYDER 
3340 MMTlton Blvd. »20O 
Ofld«fl.Uun M*<» 
BTATE OP UTAH, 
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